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lf Introduction. 
During September of 1963, East Africa^became for the first 
time in its history a net exporter of sugar. The price of 
sugar on the world market' (c.i.f. London) rose from a January, 
1962 low of £20 per ton to about £100 per ton in November of 
1963. This five fold increase in price was in part due to 
production problems and the devastation of a hurricane in Cuba, 
bad weather in Brazil, political strife in British Guiana and 
an Argentinian mill workers strike. There were also unconfirmed 
reports of a failure.of the beet crops in Holland and Russia . 
Consequently, major efforts are being made throughout the world 
and in East Africa to increase sugar production rapidly to take 
advantage of the favorable turn in prices!. At the same time if 
the disruptions in production should prove temporary, sugar 
manufacturers must guard against an overexpansion which could 
result in a year or two in a precipitous fall in price4 which 
might destroy the profitability of some of the newer ventures. 
A fear of an overexpansion of world sugar production in itself 
creates certain problems in East Africa. The internal price of 
sugar in East Africa is fixed at about £46 per ton at the factory. 
If the world price drops substantially below the internal price, 
there will be a premium for selling on the internal market. 
Thus there is the likelihood of press-ore from those who are 
proposing new sugar ventures in Kenya and Tanganyika on the 
governments of these countries to give guarantees for an internal 
market. Unless internal markets are insured for the producers 
in each country, there is the possibility that capital will fail 
to flow into sugar investment and seek more profitable oppor-
tunities in other lines or, more importantly, in other countries. 
This, of covirse can conflict v/ith the objectives of each 
government for an expansion of industry and in particular an 
expansion of the sugar industry within their own borders. Thus 
the governments of each of the three territories could conceivably 
have a stake in satisfyingthe desires on the part of some 
producers for national autarky. Another factor which might 
make national autarky attractive to the respective governments 
is that the price in eaoh territory need not be the same if 
movements of sugar are prohibited across territorial boundaries. 
Each governm^Ht could pursue its own policy with respect to excise 
taxes, producer prices and consumer prices, and the degree of 
government control of the distribution system. 
At the one extreme each of the East Africa ocuntrieg may 
pursue a policy of autarky with respect to the other two, with 
each country completely restricting imports from the other two. 
At the other extreme, the governments could co-operate and 
pursue a policy of complete integration with respect to 
production and distribution. The latter alternative has two 
economic advantages over the former. First, there may be 
considerable savings in transport costs alone. At present 
Uganda has a considerable surplus of production over"consump-
tion. Kenya's sugar requirements are only partly satisfied 
by local production and the shortfall is made up of imports from 
Uganda andfrom abroad, and every so often small amounts are 
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attempts national autarky, then Uganda would pro"ba"bly find it 
necessary to transport its surplus some 700 miles to the port 
of Mombassa while Kenya would "be transporting sugar from its 
factory near Mombassa inland to the Kenya highlands. A 
system, of distribution in which transport costs were minimized 
might require that Uganda supply northern Tanganyika and western 
Kenya, and the overall East African surplus would be exported 
from the factories of Kenya and Tanganyika near the coast, or 
the overall East African shortfall would be imported from abroad. 
A second advantage of complete integration is that production 
could be encouraged whereever costs are the lowest regardless 
of the location within a particular country. 
In order that a system of complete integration be 
politically feasible, there may have to be some compromise 
arrangements among the three territories. To compensate for 
the loss of capital investment which any one country might 
suffer by a policy of expansion wherever costs are the lowest, 
perhar3 « bargain could be arranged with respect to the 
location of other industries, or there could "be a method of 
fiscal compensation. In order to compensate the Kenya and 
Tanganyika producers if the export pries is lower than the 
internal price or in order tn compensate the Uganda producers 
if the opposite si-fc^ -bion holds, the governments could 
institute a system of price equalization payments so that a 
producer received the same price regardless of the market in 
which his sugar was sold. Alternatively, the price equali-
zation scheme could work in such a way that each producer was 
guaranteed the export price for a certain proportion of his 
output and the internal price for the rest of his output 
regardless where his sugar was sold. In any case each 
producer should bear some of the loss of revenue caused by a 
fall in the world price. This would act as a check on over-
expansion in sugar production in the face of a deteriorating 
world market. 
In order to arrive at any intelligent policy decision with 
regard to national autarky, or complete integration and 
compromise arrangements, it is necessary to make some judgement 
of the economic costs of a system of national autarky, or 
obversely, the saviiig-s which can "be obtained from a system of 
complete integration. The purpose of this paper is to arrive 
at a rough approximation of the monetary savings which would 
accrue if sugar were distributed on an East African basis. 
II. Some Characteristics of the Industry and Its Recent Past 
A. Prices and Consumption 
The price of sugar to the producer at the factory in East 
Africa is at present the same in all three territories and is 
based on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement Price (See Table I). 
This has not always been the case. In 1959? Tanganyika passed 
price control legislation and fixed the price of sugar at one-
half the former common East Africa price and one-half the 
prevailing world price. At the time it meant that Tanganyika 
sugar was priced below that in Kenya and Uganda. In July of 
1963, however, the common East Africa price was restored. 
This occurred after the Tanganyika price became very high 
•under the 1959 formula due to a very large increase in the 
world price. 
/Table I 
•Table I 
East Africa Producer Price Formula 
(a) Commonwealth Sugar Agreement Negotiation 
price C.I.P. U.K. ports for raw sugar Shs. 920.83 
(b) Plus? Premium, for plantation whites 110.00 
1030.83 
(c) Less; 
(i) Pre-World War II ocean freight 
to Mombasa Shs.26.2 5 
(ii) Port handling charges and 
agency fees " 18.00 44.2 5 
986.58 
(d) Less? Douwes Lekker deduction for 
mill white sugar 67.20 
Shs. 919.38 
Source; Ministry of Commerce and Industry (£45.97) 
in Tanganyika. 
The effective price to the producer is somewhat different 
than that given in Table I because of the existence of an 
excise tax in all three territories. In addition at least 
two of the sugar producers in Tanganyika are subject to local 
taxes of one cent a pound, and thus the effective price to 
these producers is slightly different. 
Table II 
World Sugar Prices 
1955 through June, 1963 s Price per ton of raw sugar in the 
Caribbean. Unit values of- the period or averages of monthly 
quotations during the period. 
July, 1963s End of the month quotation, London C.I.F. 
1955 £26 1962 Nov. £29 
1956 28 Dec. 34 
1957 41 Jan. 44 
1958 28 Feb. 48 
1959 24 Mar. 53 
1960 25 1963 Apr. 61 
1961 ' 23 May 84 
1962 24 Jun. 79 
Jul. 70 
Sources; International Financial Statistics, The International 
Monetary Fund, Volume XVI, Number 9 and Number 7 and 
The Financial Times, London, July 31, 1963 
From January, 1953 up until January of 1963, the 
world price of sugar was lower than the East Africa factory 
price (See Table II). For a good part of that ten year 
interval, the world price was about one-half the East Africa 
factory price of about £46 a ton. The higher internal price 
/was 
was maintained "by strict governmental control of all imports 
of sugar except for speciality sugars such as highly refined, 
cubed, and powdered sugars. As long as the import price was 
lower than the internal price, the Kenya government had to 
buy Uganda sugar at a premium. The Kenya government agreed 
to do this so long as the Uganda government consented to buy 
Kenya wheat which v/as priced above the world market by a 
marketing board. 
In February of 1963, the price situation was reversed, and 
the world market price was higher than the internal price. 
The lower East Africa price is maintained by government licensing 
of exports. In the absence of export licensing, the East 
African sugar producers would have no incentive to sell on the 
internal market and would export all their sugar. 
The average price to the consumer in East Africa is about 
50 per cent higher than the factory price. The difference is 
attributable to transportation, handling, and marketing costs. 
For sake of comparison, among 78 countries considered by 
Viton and Pignalosa,^ 35 had lower retain prices in 1957 than 
the average retail price in Uganda. The median retail price 
was 22.5 U.S. cents per kilogram while the Uganda price was 
20.4. Compared with other sugar producing countries the 
retail price in East Africa is relatively high (See Table III). 
Table III 
Retail Prices and Per Capita Consumption in Selected Sugar 
Producing Countries 1957 
Country Retail price (U.S. cents per kilogram) 
Per Capita Consumpti 
(Kilograms) 
British Guiana 9.6 41.2 
Mauritius 9.7 38.7 
Argentina 12.0 40.0 
Trinidad 12.5 36.3 
Barbados 14.1 47.8 
Brazil 16.9 33.8 
Haiti 17.6 10.2 
Jamaica 18.6 36.2 
Kenya 18.8 9.3 
Cuba 19.7 47.4 
Phillipines 20.0 11.7 
Uganda 20.4 9.4 
Tanganyika 21.6 4.8 
Netherlands 23.2 41.2 
Hong Kong 24.7 20.0 
Bahamas 25.7 26.3 
Source; A. Viton and F. Pignalosgu,-. Trends and Forces of World 
Sugar Consumption,.Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations, Rome, 1961, pp. 18 and 54. 
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The data in Table III suggest that the price elasticity 
of sugar consumption in low income countries is fairly high. 
Viton and Pignalosa calculated on the basis of time series 
data that thefprice elasticity of sugar in South Africa is about 1.20. This suggests that the low per capita sugar 
consumption in East Africa relative to other sugar producing 
areas could be raised substantially by a reduction in the 
retail price. 
Table IV 
Actual Production and Ccnsimption of Sugar in East Africa 
(Long tons.) 
Kenya-
Consumption 
Year per Consumption Production Shortfall 
capita(lb.) 
1953 15.8 46,475 16,612 29,863 
1954 16.1 ' 48.819 11,988 36.831 
1955 17.3 54,087 16,-601 37,486 
1956 19.9 63,987 19.886 44 r101 
1957 20.4 67,995 20.026 47,969 
1958 20.5 69,838 27,931 41,907 
1959 22,0 77,155 27,210 49,945 
1960 24.0 86,845 29,609 57,236 
1961 24.7 92,015 32,606 59,409 1962 25.7 98,950 32,647 65,943 
Uganda 
1953 15.5 38,761 47,973 -9,212 
1954 19.5 50,137 40.813 9,324 
1955 21.0 55,396 65,155 -9,759 1956 21.2 57,127 69,036 -11,909 
1957 20.6 56,987 80,773 -23,786 1958 €1.6 61,427 80,988 -19,561 
1959 22.0 63,831 81,077 -17,246 1960 21.0 62,486 92,978 -30,492 
1961 23.6 71,965 95,501 -23,536 1962 21.0 65,870 104,310 -38,440 
Tanganyika 
1953 8.4 30,453. 10,708 19,745 1954 9.1 33,853 10,734 23,119 
1955 9.8 37,106 10,684 26,422 1956 10.3 39.481 17,905 21,576 
1957 • 10.5 41,083 19,453 21,630 1958 10.2 40.615 21,243 • 13,371 
1959 11.6 46,841 27,649 19,199 1960 12.0 49,650 28,730 20,920 
1961 12.7 53,171 28,713 24,458 1962 13.5 57,704 36,880 20,824 
Total East Africa 
1953 12.7 115,689 75,293 40,396 1954 14.3 132,809 63,535 69,274 1955 15,4 146,' 589' 92,440 54,149 1956 16.5 160,595 106,807 53,788 1957 16.6 165,765 120,252 45,513 1958 16.8 171,880 130,162 41,718 
1959 17.9 187,827 135,936 51,891 1960 18.6 198,981 151,317 47,664 1961 19.8 217,150 156,820 60,330 1962 19.8 222,164 173,837 48,327 
Source: The East >frican.Xomiiion^Service^^rgariiaation. 
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Actual consumption in all three territories and in East 
Africa as a whole is shown in Table IV for the years .1953 to 
1962. The rate of growth of consumption was about 7.2 per ' n 
cent in Kenya, 5.2 'per cent in Uganda, 6.2 per cent in 
Tanganyika, and 6.3 per cent in East Africa as a whole. 
B. Production 
Production in all three territories and in East Africa 'for 
the years 1953 to 1962 is shown in Table IV also. The rates of 
increase are about 6.5 per cent for Kenya, 8.0 percent for Uganda, 
11.1 per cent for Tanganyika and 7.9 per cent for all of East 
Africa. Despite the fact that production in East Africa has 
grown faster than consumption, there has been a consistent shortfall 
during the ten year period prior to 1963, and East Africa has 
been a net importer of sugar. On the other hand, for the most 
part Uganda has had a considerable surplus which has been sold in 
the Kenya market. Kenya has made up most of the rest of its 
shortfalls in the period 1953 to 1962 by importing from abroad. 
Nearly all of the Tanganyika shortfalls during this same period 
were made up by imports from outside of East Africa. 
There are nine sugar producers in East Africa. Uganda has 
two producers, one at Kaklra and one at Lugazi, both near Jinja. 
There are two in Kenya, one near the coast about 80 miles south 
of Mombasa and one at ffiiwani about 20 miles east of Kisumu. 
Tanganyika has two major producers and three rather small 
producers. One major producer is at Arusha Chini about 15 miles 
south of Moshi and the other is in the Kilombero Valley 50 miles 
south of Kilosa. Of the three small producers one is in Bukoba; 
one is at Turiani near Morogoro; and the other is somewhat 
south of Arusha. 
C. Distribution 
The manner In which sugar is distributed differs from 
territory to territory. In Kenya, the entire distribution is 
handled by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Every month 
the ministry sends out directives to the two sugar mills telling 
them how much to ship to each station on the rail line. The 
ministry pays each factory the East African producer price less 
excise plus its estimate of the average transport cost to each 
point along the rail line. The factories keep track of the 
transport costs involved and either receive an extra allowance 
if transport costs exceed the ministry's estimates or must pa;/ 
back the difference if transport costs are less than the ministry's 
estimates. The government then sells the sugar at each rail 
station to a government appointed sub-agent. The price is the 
same to each sub-agent at each point along the rail line. There 
are four government appointed main agents who act as book keepers 
and collection agents from the sub-agents for the government. 
They are paid a small commission. The sub-agents may then sell 
to wholesalers or to government appointed local sub-agents. 
The maximum price at which the sub-agents may sell to local 
sub-agents and wholesalers is fixed by law as is the wholesale 
price and the retain price'. The difference-between the sub-
agents buying price and the retail price is sufficient to cover 
the cost of transport and handling from the railhead to the 
point of consumption and to cover a small commission for the 
sub-agent, the wholesaler or goveenment appointed sub-agent, 
and the retailer. The government does not have an elaborate 
inspection system to enforce the legal wholesale and retail 
prices so it is questionable as to whether the retail and 
wholesale price of sugar is as specified by law. 
/In 
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In Tanganyika, the two major manufacturers each have 
contracts with marketing firms to handle the distribution 
of their sugar. The Tanganyika Planting Company at Arusha 
Chini has a contract with Marco Surveys Limited. Marco 
Surveys "buys the sugar from the factory and sells to Its 
agents at each point along the rail line. The price to 
the agent is sufficient to cover the transport cost plus 
a commission for Marco Surveys. Thus, in contrast to 
Kenya, prices differ along the rail line according to 
differences in transport costs. Wholesale and retail 
prices are suggested by Marco Surveys. The Kilombero Sugar 
factory has nearly the same distribution arrangements with 
the International Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika 
Limited, otherwise known as Intrata. Intrata is owned 
partly by private investors and partly by the Tanganyika 
Development Corporation. Intrata hires inspectors to 
check at each point in the distribution chain to see that 
wholesalers and retailers do not sell at prices which are 
different than the prices specified by Intrata. The 
wholesale and retail prices are not fixed by law in 
Tanganyika, but the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has 
a set of what they consider reasonable prices in each area. 
If the ministry hears of any divergency from these prices-
the trader is given a warning by a locals 
government official which usually keeps the trader in line. 
The three smaller sugar firms in Tanganyika do not have such 
elaborate distribution systems but rather sell at the 
factory to traders who are willing to supply their own 
transport. 
The distribution system in Uganda is similar to the 
one in Tanganyika. The two sugar producers have contracts 
for distribution by other firms. In all three territories, 
the agents who are appointed by the government in Kenya and 
the distributing firms in Uganda and Tanganyika are required 
to keep one month's reserve stocks to forestall disruptions 
in the flow of sugar to the consumer due to uneveness in 
production schedules, floods, strikes and so forth. 
III. Prospects for the Future 
A. Production and Consumption 
The relationship between estimated production and 
consumption for the years 1963 to 1970 is given in Table V. 
TABLE V 
Estimated Production and Consumption in East Africa for 
the Years 1963 - 1970 (Long tons) 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Source; 
Estimated 
Consumption 
220,330 
251,000 
270,000 
290,000 
311,000 
334,000 
359,000 
385,000 
Minimum 
Production 
Estimate 
215,342 
220,000 
247,500 
276,000 
298,000 
328,000 
356,500 
376,000 
Maximum 
Production 
Estimate 
215,342 
246,790 
318,500 
422,000 
463,750 
520,500 
541,500 
553,000 
Minimum-
Surplus 
- 5,012 
-31,000 
- 22 , 500 
-14,000 
-13,000 
-6,000 
-2,500 
- 9 , 0 0 0 
Maximum 
Surplus 
-5,012 
-4,210 
48,500 
132,000 
151,750 
206,000 
182,500 
168,000 
East African Common Services Organization and the 
Tanganyika Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
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The consumption estimates were prepared "by the East African 
Common Services Organization. The 1963 estimate was considered 
abnormally low because of breakdowns in the system of 
distribution during the first six months of the year. The 
Kilombero factory found it necessary to shut down in February 
because not enough ripe cane was available contrary to 
expectations. The government decided to import through its 
co-operative marketing organization Cosata. Cosata, a 
relatively new organization apparently was not equipped for 
the job. There were delays of up to 2 5 days between an 
agent's request and his receipt of sugar, Finally in June 
the delays were cut to about Three days, but in the mean-time 
stocks had been depleted and many consumers, especially in 
the southern part of Tanganyika went without sugar for long 
periods. Having revised the 1963 estimate on the basis of 
what were considered normal distribution procedures, the 
Common Services Organization estimated consumption for the 
years 1964 to 1970 based on an expected rate of growth of 
8 per cent in Kenya, 8 per cent in Tanganyika, and 6 per cent 
in Uganda, These estimated rates of growth v$ere based on the 
findings of Viton and Pignalosa." Note was taken of the fact 
that in the Buganda province of Uganda, the population consumes 
a large amount of plantains which have a high sugar content. 
The Uganda rate of growth was lower on this account. 
The estimates of production in Table V are based on 
information provided by the East African Common Services 
Organization and the. Ministry of Commerce in Tanganyika. The 
maximum estimates differ from the minimum estimates largely 
because in the next two or three years it is probable that 
there will be four new sugar producers in East Africa. In 
addition, there is the possibility that two of the minor 
producers in Tanganyika will expand into major producers, and 
one of the factories in Kenya may appreciably expand 
production. 
B. Exports. 
If the maximum estimates are realized, then production 
will more than double in the seven years from, 1964 to 1970 
and East Africa will have a large exportable surplus beginning 
in 1965. The East African Common Services Organization is 
a signatory of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. East Africa 
has a quota of 10,000 tons. Under the terms of the agreement, 
if East Africa as a whole intends to be a net exporter for any 
one year, it must fulfill its quota before any sugar can be sold 
on the world market. Although some sugar was exported in 
September of 1963, East Africa is not a net exporter for 
the year, and thus the exporters were able to sell on the 
world market and take advantage of the inflated worId market 
price, The price of sugar bought under the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement is fixed at approximately the East African 
internal price for one half of the quota. If the world price 
is to fall "substantially below the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
price, then it would be to the benefit of East Africa to 
negotiate an increase in their quota under the agreement. 
In addition to the Commonwealth quota possible export 
markets include Zanzibar (about 6000 tons), Aden, Somalia, 
India, and possibly some of the western European countries. 
Sugar marketed under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement must be 
raw sugar. Sugar sold to developing countries such as 
Zanzibar, Aden and Somalia can be a low to medium quality mill 
white. However, in order to export to some of the more 
developed countries, East Africa must process a highly refined 
sugar. The factory at Kilombero in Tanganyika can produce 
refined sugar, but it is now producing mill white, because 
it has been unable to obtain a premium on the internal market 
for its higher quality sugar. The factory at Miwani in Kenya 
also has a refinery. The proposed new factory at Wami River 
/ in 
in Tanganyika will "be geared "to producing raw sugar. 
All other producers in East Africa process a mill white 
sugar of varying equalities. Raw sugar may Toe extracted 
from a mill white process but at a higher cost than that 
of a factory which is geared to producing raws alone. In 
any case it"is likely that East African producers will be able 
to produce the right quality sugars for all the possible 
markets. 
C. Alternative Approaches to Production andDistribution 
There are four important questions with regard to future 
policy. The first is whether the East African governments 
should encourage the expansion of the sugar industry or 
whether sugar production should be discouraged. Secondly, 
there is the question of future price policy (should the 
internal price be lower, and should there be premiums for 
quality on the internal market?^). Third, what should be 
the extent and method of government control of the industry 
(should the internal price be fixed and exports and imports 
licensed or should the free market be allowed to operate 
with import duties and excise taxes being the major instrument 
of government policy? Should distribution be directed by 
government agencies, para-statal organizations, or by 
private firms?)? Finally there is the question of whether 
the governments' policy should be one of (l) national 
autarky where the market in each territory is reserved to 
the producers of that territory, where imports across 
territorial boundaries are restricted, and where each 
territory would export its surplus abroad or import its 
shortfall from abroad, or one of (2-) complete integration 
where sugar may move freely across territorial borders, 
and where transportation and production costs are minimized 
throughout East Africa and not just in each territory. 
It is this latter question with which we are the most 
concerned, and we will attempt to examine it in such a way 
that our conclusions will be independent of conclusions 
reached concerning the other three questions of policy. 
The present system of production and distribution is 
neither one of national autarky nor one of complete 
integration where transport costs and production costs are 
minimized throughout East Africa. Theoretically, under a 
system of. perfect competition a minimization of transport 
costs and production costs would be achieved. The present 
situation, where distribution in Kenya is controlled by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and where the distribution 
in Uganda and Tanganyika is mostly controlled by a small 
number of firms who have agreements among themselves as to 
the extent of each one's market, is hardly one of perfect 
competition. Furthermore, there is no conscious effort 
by any central authority to attempt to minimize transport 
and production costs. The minimization of transport cp^ts 
is not necessarily an easy task in the absence of perfect 
competition. It would require an analysis of the supplies 
at each factory and the demands in each area, and an 
attempt to minimize the equation of total transport costs 
using rather sophisticated mathematical techniques. That 
the minimization of transport cost is not necessarily a 
straightforward exercise can be illustrated by the 
following considerations. Suppose there are two factories, 
Factory A and factory B. It may pay for factory A to 
supply point C even though the transport cost from factory 
B to point C is lower. The reason is that Factory B may 
be able thereby to supply point D at a much lower cost 
than factory A. If there are many factories and many 
points of consumption, the problem becomes even more complex. 
/Because 
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Because of these considerations, the situation in Tanganyika 
is one where the minimization of transport costs does not take 
place. The two major distributing firms have an agreement that 
each supplies only those points where its transport costs are 
the lowest. It is likely that in East Africa production-
costs are not minimized either. If there are differences in 
production costs then the production of a low cost factory 
should be expanded. In fact there are certain checks on the 
expansion of some sugar producers so that even if their costs 
are lower, it is difficult for them to achieve a rate of output 
of the right magnitude, In Uganda, for example, the present 
two sugar manufacturers have had some difficulty in expanding 
because of the laws concerning land alienation. The Uganda 
producers have been able to increase their production somewhat 
by engaging in rather capital intensive operations. The 
plantations are highly mechanized and use irrigation. 
A major disadvantage of the present system of production 
and distribution from the East African governments' point of 
view is that it limits the extent to which each government 
can pursue its own economic objectives and requires a high 
degree of consultation and co-ordination among the three 
territories. For example, suppose the Uganda government wants 
to lower the price of sugar to the consumer because it feels 
that expenditures on sugar form an excessively large proportion 
of the cash incomes of most consumers. At the same time, 
Tanganyika may want to keep the price of sugar relatively high 
to encourage increases in production in order to attain complete 
self-sufficiency. It is extremely difficult to follow both 
these policies simultaneously under the present system or for 
that matter -under a completely integrated set up. 
The present system of production and distribution has 
neither the advantage of a policy of national autarky, the 
ability to pursue independent policy objectives, nor the 
advantage of a system of complete integration, the minimization 
of production and transport costs. Thus there are forces 
which tend to push the governments towards either of the two 
extremes, national autarky or more complete integration. 
National autarky has the disadvantage that production and 
transportation costs will not be minimized for East Africa as 
a whole. Complete Integration has the disadvantage of limited 
independence in the pursual of territorial policy objectives 
and the drawback that there will be certain costs involved in the 
reorganization of the present distribution system. The Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry will have to divest itself of complete 
control of the distribution in Kenya, and the contracts between 
the Uganda and Tanganyika producers and their distributors will 
have to be terminated in an equitable fashion. 
The desirability of production and distribution on an East 
African basis as opposed to national autarky depends to a large 
extent on the amount of savings in production and transportation 
costs which can be achieved. In order to get a quantitative 
approximation of these savings, we attempted to formulate a 
mathematical model of the system of production and distribution 
which is described in the following section. 
IV. '"The Model of Production and Distribution. 
Within each of the three territories, it was possible to 
separate analytically 38 different focii of consumption. These 
focii comprised most of the major population and distribution 
centers in East Africa. From data supplied by the East African 
Railways and Harbours. Administration, the Ministry of Commerce 
/and 
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Given estimates of production for each distribution center, 
estimates of production by each factory, and estimates of the 
transport cost's between all points of supply and all points of 
demand, it is possible to write an equation of total transport 
costs and to write a set of equations which specify that each 
point of consumption receives its alloted amount and each 
factory disposes of its production. Using linear programming 
techniques, one can determine which factory should supply which 
distribution center in order that transport costs be minimized. 
For the year 1970, the following exercises were performeds 
(1) Assuming that the minimum production estimates for 
each factory were realized, total transport costs were 
minimized subject to the restriction that no sugar 
could be transported across territorial boundaries. 
(2) Assuming that the minimum production estimates for 
each factory were realized, total transport'costs were 
minimized on an East African basis, i.e., we assumed 
that sugar was free to move across territorial 
boundaries. 
(3) Assuming that the minimum total production estimate 
was realized but not necessarily assuming that the 
minimum estimates for each factory were realized, total 
transport costs were minimized on an East African 
basis. 
(4) Steps (l), (2) and (3) were repeated only this time 
using the maximum production estimates for each 
factory and the maximum total production estimate. 
Subtracting the minimum total transport cost in (2) from that 
in (1), one obtains an estimate of the savings which would 
result from a distribution on an East African basis if in fact 
the minimum estimates of production for each factory in 1970 
are realized. Subtracting the minimum transport cost .in (3) 
from that in (2), one obtains the additional savings obtained 
if the minimum total production estimate for 1970 is realized. 
The minimum total transport cost in (3) is obtained by assuming 
that each distribution point is supplied by the factory with 
the lowest transport cost to that point. The resulting amount 
supplied by each factory is not necessarily equal to its 
minimum production estimate, but the total amount supplies by 
all factories equals the minimum total production estimate. 
The above analysis contain several implicit assumptions. 
One is that there is an even flow throughout the year between all 
points of demand. Although production schedules in the past 
have been uneven, a steady flow can be achieved by holding 
sufficient stocks at each factory. Another assumption is that 
the product is homogeneous, i,e„, there no' differences, in quality 
or differences are insignificant as far'.as the .consumer- is concerned. 
This assumption is probably more . justified in the c-.ase of 
African and Asian consumers than it is for the small number 
of European consumers. For the export market quality can be 
a crucial factor. In working out the solutions in the four 
steps above, however, it turned out that in most instances, 
the factory at Wami River which Will be geared to producing raw 
sugar -was an exporter in sufficient quantity to satisfy the 
present obligations for raw sugar exports under the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement. It is not unreasonable to assume that some 
market can be found for all other sugar exported regardless of 
quality, although that is not to "say anything about the price 
/which 
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and Industry in Kenya, and the East African Common Services 
Organization, It was possible to determine the approximate 
percentage of sugar consumed in a country which must 
pass through each of these population centers before being 
distributed either in the center itself or in the area 
surrounding the center. Given the estimated '.: 
consumption for any year, by multiplying by the percentage 
passing through each center, it was possible to obtain 
estimates of the absolute amount passing through each center. 
Next it was necessary to determine the cost of 
transporting a ton of sugar from each of the 9 points of 
production and from the nearest point of entry (for imports) 
to each of the 38 distribution centers and to each port of 
exit (for exports). A special problem arose in this 
connexion. The two producers in Uganda and the two major 
producers in Tanganyika have negotiated special rates with 
East African Railways and Harbours. The Kenya producers 
and the minor producers in Tanganyika must transport their 
sugar on the railways at higher rates. Furthermore, the 
Railways and Harbours Administration is considering a 
change in their rate system so that rates correspond more 
closely with costs. One major change which is being 
considered is a modification of the taper. (The taper refers 
to a declining average charge per mile as distance increased). 
The present taper is such that the charge for each additional 
mile declines with distance. The Railways and Harbours 
Administration, however, calculates that the actual cost of 
each additional mile is the same regardless of distance 
although there is an initial handling and loading cost. 
If costs and rates are to be more closely correlated, this 
would require an initial fee for transporting any distance 
at all and a constant charge for each additional mile 
travelled. Of course, under such a system, the average 
charge per mile would fall with distance. 
In view of these considerations, we assumed that by 
1970 at least all East African sugar producers will have 
negotiated special rates with the railways and that the 
taper would be modified to reflect costs more accurately. 
We calculated regression coefficients with total transport 
charges as the dependent variable and distance in miles 
as the independent variable using as our sample the special 
rates which were quoted in the Official Tariff Book. The 
result was a straight line relationship between total 
transport charges and distance. In using this regression 
equation has a basis for calculating total transport fees, 
one achieves a constant charge for each additional mile and 
a falling average charge per mile. Where it was possible 
to use the rail or water transport services of East African 
Railways and Harbours between any two points, the regression 
equation was used to estimate the transport cost between 
those two points. The East African Railways and Harbours 
provides road transport -over some routes. In order to 
estimate road transport costs, we again used the special 
rates quoted in the Official Tariff Book for road services 
and calculated a regression line. Where neither road 
services nor rail or water transport were provided by 
East African Railways and Harbours, it was assumed that 
the Railways and Harbours road service rates applied. 
Finally it was necessary to obtain a set of minimum 
and maximum production estimates for each of the sugar 
factories in East Africa for the years 1963 to 1970. 
/Given 
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which may Toe obtainable for that sugar. A third implicit 
assumption is that under national autarky (restricted movement 
across territorial boundaries) the transport costs will be 
minimized within each territory and with complete integration, 
total transport,, costs will be minimized on an East African 
basis. If the divergencies from an optimal pattern of• 
distribution are about the same in either case, however, the 
estimate of savings will not be substantially affected. 
IV. Results and Conclusions 
In Table VI the results of executing the four steps in 
the previous section are summarized. 
Table VI 
Minimum 
Production 
Estimates for 
1970 Realized 
Maximum 
Production 
Estimates for 
1970 Realized 
Savings in transport costs 
if production of each 
factory as estimated 
Savings in transport costs 
if production of each 
factory allowed to vary 
Total possible savings in 
transport costs 
Estimated total transport 
costs 
Total savings as a 
percentage of estimated 
total transport costs 
Total value or production 
(Valued at the East 
African producer price of 
£46 per ton). 
Total savings as a 
percentage of the total 
value of croduction 
£249,391 
£58,990 
£303.381 
£1,263,360 
24 
£ 9,107 
£342,729 
£351,836 
£11,658,080 
19 
£17,296,000 £25,438,000 
1 
The total possible savings in transport costs are about the 
same whether the minimum or maximum production estimates hold. 
The source of savings is vastly different, however, If the 
minimum estimates hold most of the savings occur with a 
reorganization of the distribution channels. If the maximum 
estimates hold, most of the savings occur1 because of a 
reallocation of production among the firms. Since the maximum 
production estimates are based on the assumption that the 
newer ventures will go ahead as planned, this leads one to 
suspect that the relative rates of expansion should be quite 
different if the maximum savings in transport costs is to be 
achieved. 
If the minimum production estimates hold for each factory, 
then the pattern of distribution changes drastically when sugar 
is distributed on an East African basis as opposed to the 
distribution pattern under national autarky. Kenya no longer 
has to import to supply Nairobi and its environs, Voi and Mombasa. 
/instead 
Instead these centers are supplied by the Kenya factories near 
Lake Victoria. The western part- of Kenya (Kitale, Eldoret, 
Kisumu and'N akriruy and the northern part of Tanganyika 
(Shinyanga, Mwanza and Musoma) are supplied "by Uganda producers 
instead of exportation by the Uganda producers. Tanganyika 
sugar from Arusha C-hini rather than going west to Musoma and 
Singidia and east for export goes north to Nairobi, Machakos 
and Kitui. Ramisi sugar comes south to Tanga rather than 
north to Mombasa. 
If the maximum estimates hold for each factory, then 
there will be little difference in the pattern of distribution 
between a situation of national autarky and complete 
integration. The pattern in Tanganyika undergoes no change 
at all. Uganda producers supply western Kenya (Eldoret, Kitale, 
Kisumu, Nakuru, and Nairobi), and sugar produced near Lake 
Victoria in Kenya is exported. Uganda still exports but not 
so much as under national autarky. 
The estimates of total possible savings in Table VI do 
not take into account differences in production costs. If 
production costs plus transportation costs are minimized and 
there is a difference in production costs, then the savings 
will be even greater. Although total possible savings is 
only a small percentage of the total value of production, if 
there is a 10 to 20 per cent difference in production costs 
between factories, the savings could be anywhere from 5 to 
20 times greater. It is very likely therefore, that if 
policies can be devised and adopted which encourage production 
whereever costs are lowest, then very substantial savings in 
absolute terms can be realized. 
On the other hand, the total possible savings in 
transport Costs alone are quite a large percentage of the 
total estimated transport bill in either case. To give 
this figure some context, the total possible savings in 
transport costs in either case represents about 17 per cent 
of the estimated 1962/63 Uganda government expenditures on 
roads, about 10 per cent of the estimated 1962/63 Uganda-
government expenditure on education, and about 10 per cent 
of the expenditure on law and orderlO. 
One must keep in mind that the savings in transport costs 
are based on a set of revised transport charges and not actual 
charges as given in the Official Tariff Book. If the present 
official rates were used, the savings would be somewhat 
larger. There is reason to believe, however, that the revised 
rates more' accurately reflect the true costs of transport. 
Finally, there is the question of who will benefit from • 
the savings in transport costs. Since the total possible 
savings is such a small percentage of the total value of 
production, the possible difference in price to the consumer 
would be almost negligible. Most likely, the only way 
consumers could benefit significantly would be through a 
rationalization on the basis of production costs and/or a 
closer relationship between prices and costs. If the East 
African producer price is lowered for example, then retail 
prices would be more in line with prices in other sugar 
producing countries, and consumers would benefit from this 
lower price. Furthermore,the savings in transport costs 
would still be the same and constitute a larger percentage 
reduction in price to the consumer. If the savings resulted 
in a higher price to the producer, then it would most likely 
mean a significant increase in profits. Alternatively,the 
governments could raise the sugar excise duty and rake off the 
savings as increased government revenue. 
/Footnotes. 
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Footnotes; 
1. Throughout this paper East Africa refers to the 
three territories of Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya. 
2. See East African Trade and Industry, Volume X, 
Number 113, July, 1963, p.34. 
3. See East Africe-n Trade and Industry, Volume X, 
Number 109, p.14. 
4. Sugar is an 18 month crop. See The Economic 
Development of Uganda, a report of a mission 
organized by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Baltimore, John 
Hopkins Press, 1962, p.176 
5. A.Viton and F. Pignalosa, Trends and Forces of 
World Sugar Consumption, Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1961, 
p.18. 
6. Ibid, p.77 
7. See the Laws of Kenya, Price Control Ordinance, 
Chapter 504, Subsidiary Legislation, Orders under 
section 5. 
8. Op.cit. 
9. For a discussion of quality control and premiums 
for quality see Report by Dr. K. Douwes Dekker on 
the quality of East African sugar, 1959. 
10. See Uganda Government, 1962 Statistical Abstract, 
Statistics Branch of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Entebbe, p.68. 

